# 1ncs v Baudrillard

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### 1nc – t

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must defend an expansion of the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### Expand means make greater

Maine Supreme Court 2k (SAUFLEY, J. Opinion in Bangs v. Town of Wells, 760 A. 2d 632 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000. Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/12/21).

[¶ 19] Wells's interpretation of subsection 3(M) is not consistent with the plain language of the statute. See Kimball, 2000 ME 20, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d at 392 (explaining the rules of statutory construction). The plain meaning of the word "expand" means "to make or become greater in size."[9] WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 241 (1996). Further, the language of the statute requires that municipalities give reasonable consideration to the expansion of existing "mobile home parks" as opposed to allowing "mobile home park lots" or "mobile home park density" to expand. Therefore, a logical and consistent reading of the statute encompasses mobile home parks' growth in physical area rather than merely in density. See Town of Madison, Dep't of Elec. Works v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 231, 234 (Me.1996).

#### Scope means range or extent

Wisconsin Court of Appeals 20 (BLANCHARD, J. Opinion in APPLEGATE-BADER FARM, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Appeal No. 2018AP1239 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/21/21).

¶45 Returning to the text of WIS. STAT. § 227.135(4), we identify the meaning of the term "scope." Neither WIS. STAT. § 227.01 nor § 227.135 define "scope." Therefore, we resort to dictionary definitions that appear to be pertinent. "Scope" in § 227.135(4) means the range or extent of the subject involved in the "proposed rule."[13] We now address the wider context of WIS. STAT. ch. 227 as a whole, which demonstrates that the range or extent of a subject referenced in § 227.135(4) cannot reasonably be read to focus narrowly on any "meaningful or measurable" changes to draft rules.

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of government action.

#### Two impacts:

#### Fairness — debate requires effective competition between the aff and the neg---the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate.

#### Clash, debate is unique because of the iteration of limited arguments over the course of a season that forces debaters to improve their arguments and reconsider their positions. Their topic is unilaterally declared and imprecise, which prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing. Turns case: Movement building — reading an internal link chain about tearing down capitalism is a better pedagogical tool for understanding movements. “Fiatting” them into existence papers over motivation and policy concerns that are at the heart of movement building.

### 1nc – k

#### The aff’s call to destroy normative activism that takes the form of communicative archiving in debate is unable to actually change debate, the staging of their argument merely ends up debating destruction, which subverts the very theoretical basis of their position – they merely convert the supposed impediment to their desire into a desire for impediment, a mechanism to keep their unsatisfied desire always open

Zizek 8 Slavoj, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities at University of London, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Sociology at University of Llubljana, the Elvis of cultural theory, former candidate for Slovenian presidency, For They Know Not What They Do, p.142-4

The elementary form of hysteria, hysteria par excellence, is the so-called "conversion hysteria" [Konversionshysterie], where the subject "gives body" to his deadlock, to the kernel that he is unable to put in words, by means of a hysterical symptom, the abnormality of a part of his body or bodily functions (he starts to cough without any apparent physical reason; he repeats compulsive gestures; his leg or hand stiffens, although there is nothing medically wrong with it, and so on). In this precise sense we speak of hysterical conversion: the impeded traumatic kernel is "converted" into a bodily symptom; the psychic content that cannot be signified in the medium of common language makes itself heard in a distorted form of "body language". From this brief sketch, one can already guess where the connection with Hegel lies: a homologous conversion is what defines "figures of consciousness" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. "Lordship and Bondage", "Unhappy Consciousness", "Law of the Heart", "Absolute Freedom", and so on, are not just abstract theoretical positions; what they name is always also a kind of "existential dramatization" of a theoretical position whereby a certain surplus is produced: the "dramatization" gives the lie to the theoretical position by bringing out its implicit presuppositions.3 In "dramatizing" his position, the subject renders manifest what remains unspoken in it, what must remain unspoken for this position to maintain its consistency. In other words, the "dramatization reflects the conditions of a theoretical position overlooked by the subject who holds to it: the "figure of consciousness" stages “figures") the concealed truth of a position - in this sense, every “figure of consciousness" implies a kind of hysterical theatre. We can see already how the logic of this dramatization subverts the classical idealist relationship of a theoretical Notion and its exemplification: far from reducing exemplification to an imperfect illustration of the Idea, the staging produces "examples" which, paradoxically, subvert the very Idea they exemplify - or, as Hegel would say, the imperfection of the example with regard to the Idea is an index of the imperfection proper to the Idea itself. ;• What we have here is quite literally a "conversion": the figuration ("acting out") of a theoretical impasse (of the "unthought" of a theoretical position) and at the same time the inversion best rendered by one of Hegel's constant rhetorical figures: when, for example, Hegel deals with the ascetic's position, he says that the ascetic converts the denial of the body into the embodied denial. Here, we must take care not to mistake this inversion for the simple mirror-reversal that just turns the elements round within the confines of the same configuration: the crucial point is that the Hegelian conversion is "mediated" by an impossibility - since the ascetic is unable to deny the body (this would simply mean death), the only thing that remains to him is to embody denial itself - to organize his bodily life as a standing disavowal and renunciation. His own practice thereby subverts the theoretical position according to which the earthly, bodily life is inherently null and worthless: all the time he is preoccupied with his body, inventing new ways of mortifying and pacifying it, instead of assuming an indifferent distance towards it. The passage from one "figure of consciousness" to the next occurs when the subject takes cognizance of this gap separating his "enunciated" (his theoretical position) from his position of enunciation and assumes thereby what he unknowingly staged as his new explicit theoretical position: each "figure of consciousness", so to speak, stages in advance what will become the next position. And what is hysteria if not the bodily staging of the same rhetorical figure? According to Lacan, the fundamental experience of man qua being-of-language is that his desire is impeded, constitutively dissatisfied: he "doesn't know what he really wants". What the hysterical "conversion" accomplishes is precisely an inversion of this impediment, by means of it, the impeded desire converts into a desire for impediment; the unsatisfied desire converts into a desire for unsatisfaction; a desire to keep our desire "open"; the fact that we "don't know what we really want" - what to desire - converts into a desire not to know, a desire for ignorance.... Therein consists the basic paradox of the hysteric's desire: what he desires is above all that his desire itself should remain unsatisfied, hindered - in other words: alive as a desire. Lacan demonstrated this with brilliance apropos of the dream of the "merry butcher's wife" quoted by Freud:4 as a defiance to Freud, to his theory that a dream is a fulfilled wish, she proposed a dream in which the wish is not fulfilled; the solution to this enigma, of course, is that her true desire was precisely that her too-compliant husband should for once not satisfy her whim, thus keeping her desire open and alive. This conversion confirms the "reflective" nature of desire: desire is always also a desire for desire itself, a desire to desire or not to desire something.

#### Their commitment to a politics of disorientation and interruption papers over the patriarchal economy of desire that forms the substrate of hegemonic politics - the ultimate function is to sustain the order of mastery that produces the conditions of possibility for imperialization

Lundberg 12 Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175

As a mode of individuation and subjectivization, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for the addressee to provide an automatic fulfillment of a need. The generative power of the demand relies on two things: the split between the demand and the need that it attempts to redress, and the fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because the refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfill all the subject’s needs, requiring a set of compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. “Ego,” then, names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the meta- phor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of develop- ment, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may i have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authori- tative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the parental “no.” in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function. . . . [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in mo- tion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the indi- vidual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfill- ment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by ex- tension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” under- standing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the sub- ject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoreti- cal movement transposes freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective inten- tions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of ac- commodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing de- mands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As i have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal i. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a non- relationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. need approximates the position of the freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to no- tice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of ful- filling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the other. Thus, the specificity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that de- mand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand. This impossibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “in this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the constitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The structural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the freudian de- mand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . it is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . . In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization. The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jou- issance as equivalent with hegemony. one way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gérard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the other while simultaneously demanding that the other pro- vide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the “hysteric . . . cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own. . . . [i]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge. . . . [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition—being put under pressure to answer a question.”44 Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduc- tion: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes naming in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a sig- nificant test case for the equation between jouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics. On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One’s Demands The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. for the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity net- work and the Seattle independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. if danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to re- affirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. first, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the be- ginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such in- stitutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engage- ment with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dan- gerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTo often function at the cost of addressing how practices of glob- alization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the “politics of policy and public debate.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hys- terical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analyti- cal cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that repre- sent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically com- promised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied.”46 one outcome of framing demand as an affective and symbolic process tied to a set of determinate rhetorical functions enjoins against the simple celebration of demands as either exclusively liberatory, as unproblematic modes of resistance, as exhausting the political, or as nodes for the production of political identity along the lines of equivalence. Alternatively, a politics of desire requires that the place of the demand in a political toolbox ought to be relativized: demands are useful as a precursor to articulating desire; they are important when moored to a broader political strategy; but they are dangerous if seen as the summum bonum of political life. A politics of desire thus functions simply as a negative constraint on the efficacy of a politics of demand, and as a practice a politics of desire asks that political subjects constantly test their demands against the measure of desire or against an explicitly owned set of political investments that envision an alternative world. it is the presence of this alternative, explicitly owned as a desired end state of the political, that might become the prerequisite for desire-based solidarities in- stead of demand-driven affinities, and as such, a politics of desire recognizes the inevitability and productivity of frustrated demand as part and parcel of antagonistic democratic struggle.

#### The quest to reunite with the real makes pleasure contingent on the externalized violence of the death drive - that leads to lashout and endless scapegoating

McGowan 9 Todd, Associate Professor of Film at the University of Vermont. | “A Violent Ethics: Mediation and the Death Drive” in *OBSERVATOIRE DE L'IMAGINAIRE CONTEMPORAIN*, 1 February 2009. <http://oic.uqam.ca/en/communications/a-violent-ethics-mediation-and-the-death-drive>

What most contemporary theorists of violence share is the goal of reducing violence. They theorize about violence in order to work toward its reduction or elimination. But the problem of violence is not that we experience too much of it but that we don’t experience the way that violence as such undergirds our existence as subjects. This is why we might look at the infinite diffusion of mediated violence as an extension of what is fundamental to us and, as a result, revelatory rather than destructive. Violence, and the rupture it suggests, marks the foundation of our subjectivity, and it is necessary for the subject’s sustenance. In his commentary of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Alexandre Kojève makes precisely this point. He notes, “Man is not a being that is: he is a Nothing that annihilates by the negation of being” (Kojève, 1947: 181). Through the violent act, we tear ourselves out of undifferentiated being and emerge as subjects. This negating gesture is the positive condition for subjectivity, which remains inseparable from it. Our existence as subjects is thus a thoroughly violent existence. Obviously, the violence that Kojève theorizes is not identical to what we usually think of as violence — fighting, the use of weapons, and so on — but actual acts of violence are a manifestation of the original violence that gives birth to subjectivity. Actual acts of violence repeat and sustain this original negation. Utopian attempts to eradicate violence fail because they don’t account for the ontological primacy of violence. For the utopian of whatever stripe, violence erupts because some other aspect of our existence misfires: for instance, Charles Fourier links violence to poverty; Wilhelm Reich traces it to sexual repression; and Francis Fukuyama sees large scale violence as the product of competing ideologies[ In each case and in numerous others, there is an explanation for violence in other foundational disturbances. This way of understanding violence is not confined to utopian speculation but infiltrates ordinary liberal and conservative conceptions as well. For the liberal, violence is the product of inadequate education or insufficient life chances, while for the conservative it is the result of an absence of proper moral training. There are few who try to theorize violence itself as foundational. Even one of the great thinkers who attempted to do so, Sigmund Freud, took a long time to accede to this conception. Prior to 1920, Freud interprets violence as a secondary phenomenon. It represents an expression of a more primary drive — a libidinal or a preservative drive. The early Freud can imagine, if not an actual utopia, movement in the direction of utopia through the lifting of sexual repression. The liberty of sexual expression might, according to Freud’s initial drive theory, limit the turn toward violence. (Herbert Marcuse advances a form of this thesis in Eros and Civilization.) But when Freud conceives of the death drive as he writes Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he abandons all possibility of utopian speculation. He comes to accept violence as fundamental for us as subjects, which breaks the link between lifting sexual repression and limiting violence. In his famous formulation of the post-1920 Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud insists, “It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness” (Freud, 1961). The absence of sexual repression does nothing, Freud comes to see, to satisfy the death drive’s appetite for destruction that often manifests itself in aggressiveness. For the later Freud, there is no possibility of imagining the elimination of violence. Though Freud never precisely articulates it, violence becomes even more primary than sex in his later theory. The death drive, which is our attraction to violent loss and the subversion of what seems like progress, comes to define subjectivity, and the pleasure principle comes to function within it rather than as an independent force. But the death drive is not, despite the interpretation given by many of Freud’s followers, reducible to aggressiveness aimed at others. The violence of the death drive — that is, of the drive as such — is that of a fundamental rupture. This rupture occurs through an act of sacrifice that engenders and sustains subjectivity by dividing the subject from itself and thereby creating the possibility of desire. As Richard Boothby notes, “the being of the sacrificer emerges for the first time only with the loss effected by the act of sacrifice” (Boothby, 2001: 247). Through violent self-sacrifice, we create an object that will provide the key to our capacity for enjoyment insofar as it remains lost, and the impossible status of this object will serve to animate our desire as it moves metonymically from substitute to substitute. The point is not that everyone is a masochist but that our subjectivity comes into being through loss, a loss which constitutes us as desiring subjects and the lost object that orients our desire. The appeal of violence rests on its replication of the original severing of the link to the lost object and our very capacity for enjoyment. The enjoyment that we derive from violence comes from the proximity to the lost object that it produces, which is why our appetite for violence in various forms is almost insatiable. The violence of the drive often manifests itself in the form of external violence — violence against others — rather than in its original form of the violent rupture. Even though the drive seeks rupturing loss as the primary target for its violence, this type of violence is at odds with the pleasure principle and thus encounters an almost intractable barrier. The subject’s enjoyment found through rupturing loss does not produce pleasure but instead the displeasure of losing one’s mastery. The rupturing loss that produces our subjectivity also deprives us of any sense of mastery over ourselves or others. We search for a way to reconcile the enjoyment of the drive with our capacity for pleasure, and we find this amalgam in turning our violence toward the exterior world. Violence directed toward others is a modification of the drive away from its initial target. By inflicting loss on others, we enjoy the drive and experience the pleasure of mastery at the same time. But the problem with violence directed outward (setting aside whatever moral qualms we might have with it) is that it involves a fundamental misrecognition. Even when we are committing violence toward others, we enjoy the experience of the rupture rather than that of inflicting damage or pain. Since the true target of the drive’s violence is loss, our enjoyment of aggressive violence depends on our identification with the loss experienced by our victims, though the pleasure deriving from aggressiveness hides the nature of this enjoyment. Enjoyment has a necessary relation to loss and suffering because our capacity to enjoy is inextricably attached to the lost object that emerges through rupture. However, though we enjoy as the object of violence, only violence directed toward others provides the pleasure that renders violence bearable. The key difficulty arising from the violence of the drive involves our inability to find pleasure in the violence of rupture, which is the original form that violence takes.

#### The alternative is to adopt the discourse of the analyst, renouncing the position of the subject supposed to- know and uncovering the traumatic knowledge of the 1ac – an intimate relationship with the unconscious unlocks the very possibility of learning in the first place

Cho 9 K. Daniel, Associate Professor in the Department of Education at Otterbein University. | *Psychopedagogy: Freud, Lacan, and the Psychoanalytic Theory of Education*, Published by Palgrave McMillan, 15 May 2009. \*\*\*we don’t endorse gendered language\*\*\*

There are of course many forms or strategies of resistance, but the relation or bond that presents the strongest impediment to the unconscious is, of course, the transference itself insofar as it is predicated upon the existence of the “subject supposed to know.” For that reason, the transference itself must ultimately be overcome. Lacan calls this overcoming the “liquidation of the transference” (S XI:267). As the transference is liquidated, the discourse of the analyst emerges. The most powerful tool for liquidating the transference and causing a shift to the analyst’s discourse is what Lacan refers to as the analyst’s desire. The analyst’s desire is, in a certain way, the foundation and motor-force of transference. Lacan cannot stress this point enough, describing it as “the axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer . . . the inertia, that lies behind . . . the transference” (235). The simplest way to use the tool of the analyst’s desire is to ask questions: “What does this mean?” “Can you tell me?” “What do you think?” and so on. Or, to make brief leading statements: “Tell me more,” “Very interesting,” “You’re on to something,” and so on. Or, even, to express a lack of knowledge: “I have never thought of it that way,”“I want to know more,” and so on. Rather than showing incompetence, the analyst’s desire signals that the analyst is not a master, not all knowing. Desire is a sign that the analyst is renouncing the position of “subject supposed to know.” In relinquishing this title, space is created for the analysand’s own desire to come into play in the form of desiring to know what the analyst desires to know: “Concerning the position called that of the analyst . . . it’s as identical with the object a, that is to say with what presents itself for the subject as the cause of desire . . . insofar as it sets out on the trace left by the desire to know” (S XVII:106). Lacan explains: “The analyst makes himself the cause of the analysand’s desire” (38). Functioning as the cause of the other’s desire is the defining role the analyst plays within the analyst’s discourse: “This is where the analyst positions himself. He positions himself as the cause of desire” (152). The conduit, in the analyst’s discourse, that links these desires is the (liquidating) transference: “Behind the love known as transference, is the affirmation of the link between the desire of the analyst and the desire of the patient” (S XI:254). Encountering the analyst’s desire turns the analysand into a learner insofar as there becomes a desire to know what the other wants to know. So, what indeed does the analyst desire to know?—the answer is, of course, quite simple: the traumatic knowledge stored in the unconscious. Acting as the cause of desire, the analyst’s desire directs the analysand as learner to the unconscious. And the more in tune these learners become with the unconscious, the less need there is for the guidance of the analyst’s desire until finally the transference is totally liquidated and the unconscious has come fully into the position of “subject supposed to know.” When interjecting desire, the analyst must take care not to allow it to be pinned down to anything specific. The analyst’s desire must always remain elusive to prevent identification. Yet, while it must not be attached to anything concrete, Lacan is careful to say that the “analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it” (276). The analyst’s desire is not pure, because it is partial toward the unconscious. It obtains absolute difference in two ways: first, because it differentiates the person of the analyst from the position of “subject supposed to know” and, second, because it dissolves the imaginary relation thus separating analyst and analysand. Lacan continues: “There only may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live.” In what way does the liquidation of the transference signify a “limitless love”? At the final stages of the psychoanalytic learning process, when the transference is finally liquidated, the “psychoanalyst typically extracts himself” (S XVII:185), leaving the analysand alone to learn directly from the unconscious itself. The analyst’s final act is to remove every last trace of their presence, including desire, from the situation so that the analysand may finally become a student of the unconscious. This act of self-extraction so that learning may go forward is an act of love. Liquidating the transference is, as Freud and Lacan claim, a long and arduous process, and there will inevitably be times when the analysand refuses to follow the analyst’s desire. The reasons are various: for fear of being ashamed, in rebellion to authority, out of arrogance, and so on. Freud’s case studies display the full range of possible reasons. At these moments, it is vital that the analyst not fall into the temptation of abandoning desire. Rather than withdraw, the analyst must redouble the commitment to desire. The analyst’s persistence in desire constitutes a kind of ethical position: “From an analytical point of view, the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire” (S VII:319).

### 1nc – pik

#### We endorse the entirety of the 1ac except for their use of market metaphors.

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

## on

### 1nc – presumption

#### Vote NEG on presumption –

#### scholars have been circulating their arguments outside of debate, and no change has happened. No reason the symbolic affirmation of voting AFF is key.

#### They don’t solve info about antitrust – they do technical debate, try to win tournaments, and convince the judges logically. Every time you think they’re winning is a link to our offense as them keeping debating keeps others coming to tournaments to produce knowledge about antitrust and to learn how to shut down their strategy.

#### No warrant for the ballot – they read the 1AC, there’s no reason voting for it solves anything – either they did enough to stop knowledge production in this round so you can vote neg to vote aff or they are wrong so you vote neg anyways

### 1nc – commodification turn

#### The aff is a double turn – if they’re right that normative politics gets coopted by semiocapitalism that means the aff gets copied and redeployed to suture capitalism – just because they ironically know they’re being commodified doesn’t stop that process – they just picked a basic ass semiotics aff and used it to play the game better.

#### They’re the next big thing!

Frank 97– prof of American History at Univ of Chicago [Thomas The Business of Culture in the new Gilded Age Commodify Your Dissent: Salvos from The Baffler ed. By Frank and Weiland; “Why Johnny Can’t Dissent”; Pages 31-32)

CAPITALISM IS CHANGING, obviously and drastically. From the moneyed pages of the Wall Street journal to TV commercials for airlines and photocopiers we hear every day about the new order’s globe spanning, cyber-accumulating ways. But our notion about what’s wrong with American life and how the figures responsible are to be confronted haven't changed much in thirty years. Call it, for convenience, the “countercultural idea.” It holds that the paramount ailment of our society is conformity, a malady that has variously been described as over-organization, bureaucracy, homogeneity, hierarchy, logocentrism, technocracy, the Combine, the Apollonian. We all know what it is and what it does. It transforms humanity into “organization man,” into “the man in the gray flannel suit.” It is “Moloch whose mind is pure machinery, ”the “incomprehensible prison” that consumes “brains and imagination.” It is artifice, starched shirts, tailfins, carefully mowed lawns, and always, always, the consciousness of impending nuclear destruction. It is a stiff, militaristic order that seeks to suppress instinct, to forbid sex and pleasure, to deny basic human impulses and individuality, to enforce through a rigid uniformity a meaningless plastic consumerism. As this half of the countercultural idea originated during the 1990s, it is appropriate that the evils of conformity are most conveniently summarized with images of 1950s suburban correctness. You know, that land of sedate music, sexual repression, deference to authority, Red Scares, and smiling white people standing politely in line to go to church. Constantly appearing as a symbol of arch backwardness in advertising and movies, it is an image we find easy to evoke. The ways in which this system are to be resisted are equally Well understood and agreed-upon. The Establishment demands homogeneity; we revolt by embracing diverse, individual lifestyles. It demands self-denial and rigid adherence to convention; we revolt through immediate gratification, instinct uninhibited, and liberation of the libido and the appetites. Few have put it more bluntly than jerry Rubin did in 1970: “America says: Don’t! The hippies say: Do lt!" The countercultural idea is hostile to any law and every establishment. “Whenever we see a rule, we must break it,” Rubin continued. “Only by breaking rules do we discover who we are. ”Above all rebellion consists of a sort of Nietzschean antinomianism, an automatic questioning of rules, a rejection of whatever social prescriptions we 've happened to inherit. Just Do It is the whole of the law. But one hardly has to go to a poetry reading to see the countercultural idea acted out. Its frenzied ecstasies have long since become an official aesthetic of consumer society, a monotheme of mass as well as adversarial culture. Turn on the TV and there it is instantly: the unending drama of consumer unbound and in search of an ever-heightened good time, the inescapable rock 'n' roll soundtrack, dreadlocks and ponytails bounding into Taco Bells, a drunken, swinging-camera epiphany of tennis shoes, outlaw soda pops, and mind-bending dandruff shampoos. Corporate America, it turns out, no longer speaks in the voice of oppressive order that it did when Ginsberg moaned in 1956 that Time magazine was “always telling me about responsibility. Businessmen are serious. Movie producers are serious. Everybody 's serious but me.” Nobody wants you to think they’re serious today, least of all Time Warner. On the contrary: the Culture Trust is now our leader in the Ginsbergian search for kicks upon kicks. Corporate America is not an oppressor but a sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accouterments, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for that ever-more apocalyptic orgasm. The countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new; its taste for self-fulfillment and its intolerance f1or the confines of tradition now permitting vast latitude in consuming practices and lifestyle experimentation. Consumerism is no longer about “conformity” but about “difference.” Advertising teaches us not in the ways of puritanical self-denial (a bizarre notion on the face of it), but in orgiastic, never-ending self'-fulfillment. It counsels not rigid adherence to the tastes of the herd but vigilant and constantly updated individualism. We consume not to fit in, but to prove, on the surface at least, that we are rock 'n' roll rebels, each one of us as rule-breaking and hierarchy-defying as our heroes of the 60s, who now pitch cars, shoes, and beer. This imperative of endless difference is today the genius at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeing from “sameness” that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colors and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-Eleven. As existential rebellion has become a more or less official style of Information Age capitalism, so has the countercultural notion of a static, repressive Establishment grown hopelessly obsolete. However the basic impulses of the countercultural idea may have disturbed a nation lost in Cold War darkness, they are today in fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of Information Age business theory. So close are they, in fact, that it has become difficult to understand the countercultural idea as anything more than the self justifying ideology of the new bourgeoisie that has arisen since the 1960s, the cultural means by which this group has proven itself ever so much better skilled than its slow-moving, security-minded forebears at adapting to the accelerated, always-changing consumerism of today. The anointed cultural opponents of capitalism are now capitalism’s ideologues. The two come together in perfect synchronization in a figure like Camille Paglia, whose ravings are grounded in the absolutely noncontroversial ideas of the golden sixties. According to Paglia, American business is still exactly what it was believed to have been in that beloved decade, that is, “puritanical and desensualized.” Its great opponents are, of course, liberated figures like “the beatniks,” Bob Dylan, and the Beatles. Culture is, quite simply, a binary battle between the repressive Apollonian order of capitalism and the Dionysian impulses of the counterculture. Rebellion makes no sense without repression; we must remain forever convinced of capitalism's fundamental hostility to pleasure in order to consume capitalism’s rebel products as avidly as we do. It comes as little surprise when, after criticizing the “Apollonian capitalist machine” (in her book, Kamp.: 6' Tramps), Paglia applauds American mass culture (in Utne Reader), the preeminent product of that “capitalist machine,” as a “third great eruption” of a Dionysian “paganism.” For her, as for most other designated dissidents, there is no contradiction between replaying the standard critique of capitalist conformity and repressiveness and then endorsing its rebel products—for Paglia the car culture and Madonna—as the obvious solution: the Culture Trust offers both Establishment and Resistance in one convenient package. The only question that remains is why Paglia has not yet landed an endorsement contract from a soda pop or automobile manufacturer.

### 1nc – AT info dissuasive

#### Debate is key to create the skills necessary to translate ideas and information across differences

Mitchell 10 (Gordon R. - Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs the William Pitt Debating Union. “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010, pp. 95–120)

Evidence and Argument Fields in Intelligence Community Deliberations “The axiom of all rhetoric” is the “principle of insufficient reason,” says Hans Blumenberg.13 In this formulation, when a pressing situation calls for action, but all the facts are not yet in, rhetoric lends practical guidance to those seeking to navigate uncharted waters. In Lloyd Bitzer’s shopworn terminology, such “rhetorical situations” are meaning vacuums that invite, even “call” discourse to the scene as “fitting” remedies for the “imperfect” state of affairs.14 Yet the current era of “content abundance”15 seems to invert this commonly held sense of the rhetorical situation, as we struggle to stay afloat in the wake of new waves of facts, figures, and testimony churned out by today’s proliferating sites of knowledge production.16 According to Richard Lanham, “we’re drowning” in this endemic state of surplus information, struggling to marshal sufficient attention to make sense of it all.17 To capture this sense of inundation, Damien Pfister coins the term “hyperpublicity” to describe the “massive expansion in the capacity of personal media to record, archive, and make searchable thoughts, events, and interactions in publicly accessible databases.” In this meaning-saturated environment, which has “double potential to enrich and threaten public life,”18 the challenge has less to do with figuring out how to make practical decisions based on scarce shreds of evidence (rhetoric filling a lack) and more to do with sorting through ever-expanding mounds of evidence whose relevance to pressing decisions may not be immediately apparent (rhetoric responding to a surplus). The official U.S. intelligence community routinely faces such inverted rhetorical situations when it is called upon to deliver consensus judgments such as National Intelligence Estimates. To reach such judgments, analysts must comb through terabytes of digital data from sigint (signals intelligence gathered from satellites and other monitoring devices), humint (human intelligence drawn from informants and agents), as well as a burgeoning supply of “open source” intelligence (data in the public domain). As the community is composed of 16 separate agencies and entities that each serve diff erent customers and pursue distinct approaches to intelligence analysis, heterogeneous perspectives often complicate the process of sorting the proverbial wheat from the chaff . As Simon and Hart explain, “the basic problem stems from moving knowledge created using evidence and analysis in one group or organisation into another. This is not a trivial undertaking, because the process, language and ultimate purpose of the created knowledge often differ radically between the originating and receiving organisations.” As a result, “analyses involving jihadist perceptions or technical details concerning chemical, biological or nuclear weapons can often generate interpretive or semantic differences between originating and receiving organisations as to what a word, measurement or outcome actually means.”19 Here, centrifugal forces of professional specialization and horizontal knowledge diff usion scatter the pool upon which analysts draw data. Simultaneously, centripetal forces oblige these same analysts to synthesize vast sums of diverse information and render coherent arguments on complex and multifaceted issues. This challenge stems from a tension borne from the push brought about by the splintering of the intelligence community into disparate agencies, on the one hand, and the pull of institutional directives requiring coordination of intelligence products, on the other. Surmounting this complex epistemological dilemma requires more than sheer information processing power; it demands forms of communicative dexterity that enable translation of ideas across differences and facilitate cooperative work by interlocutors from heterogeneous backgrounds. How can such communicative dexterity be cultivated? Hart and Simon see structured argumentation as a promising tool in this regard. In their view, the unique virtue of rigorous debates is that they “support diverse points of view while encouraging consensus formation.” This dual function of argumentation provides “both intelligence producers and policy consumers with a view into the methodologies and associated evidence used to produce analytical product, effectively creating a common language that might help move knowledge across organisational barriers without loss of accuracy or relevance.”20 Hart and Simon’s insights, coupled with the previously mentioned institutional initiatives promoting switch-side debating in the intelligence community, carve out a new zone of relevance where argumentation theory’s salience is pronounced and growing. Given the centrality of evidentiary analysis in this zone, it is useful to revisit how argumentation scholars have theorized the functions of evidence in debating contexts. In the words of Austin Freeley, “evidence is the raw material of argumentation. It consists of facts, opinions and objects that are used to generate proof.”21 Here, evidence becomes the “factual foundation for the claims of the advocates.”22 When an interlocutor attempts to forward claims based on data, “the process of advancing from evidence to conclusion is argument.”23 What are the different types of evidence? Which are most persuasive in certain situations? How can evidence be misused? What doesn’t count as legitimate evidence? In the field of argumentation, scholars have long grappled with these questions, often by developing idiosyncratic taxonomies of evidence usage.24 So, for example, one textbook breaks down types of evidence into three categories—examples, statistics, and authority—and three sources—original, hearsay, and written.25 An earlier eff ort identifies three “forms of data that provide proof for a claim” as unwritten, ordinary, and expert.26 In a blistering critique, Dale Hample questions the usefulness of these projects: “The typologies—for they are indeed plural—diff er from textbook to textbook and have never been defended as having any phenomenal reality for anyone not taking an argumentation exam.”27 One factor accounting for the limited conceptual appeal of these evidence taxonomies is that such schemes are tied tightly to the practical activity associated with their development—intercollegiate debating. Since as Dean Fadely points out, the “bedrock of contest debate” is evidence,28 it is only natural that many of these taxonomical efforts are designed to support student classroom work. For example, the preface to Robert and Dale Newman’s 1969 Evidence explains, “This book is designed primarily for students of exposition, discussion, persuasion, and argument who must buttress their speeches or essays with evidence.”29 Such a pedagogical orientation underwrites the practical dimension of evidence studies, where the emphasis rests on cultivating invention skills sufficient to enable students to research, deploy, and defend evidenced claims in argumentative situations.30

### 1nc – AT acceleration

**Politics aren’t dead – speed and acceleration enable new forms of dissent**

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Both **Virilio and Baudrillard are** **highly pessimistic about** **the prospects of direct political action** **in the late modern world**. One of the main themes in Virilio's latest book revolves around the environmental pollution of not only our atmosphere and hydrosphere, but also of our planet's time-space relationship. This "dromospheric pollution," he claims, eludes all democratic controls and will soon precipitate a yet unknown fatal event, "the accident of all accidents, or, in other words, the [global] circulation of the generalised accident" (Virilio 1995: 35, 47, 83-4, 90, 98-9). Baudrillard's apocalyptic vision looks slightly different. For him, **the ability to exert human agency has been annihilated because the link between "realities" and "referents" no longer exist.** **And since we have no more reality, theory can no longer dissent against it** (see Smart 1993:122-3; Welsch 1993:208-11) But **things do not** necessarily have to look this grim. **One can accept** **the** **rapidly changing nature** **of the late modern world and**, at the same time, **explore new forms of activism** that emerge. **The most potent of these terrains of dissent are perhaps located in the types of struggles that lead to a slow transformation of societal values**. Reading Virilio (1995:31) may help us recognise the contours of such a position: The question no longer is one that opposes the global in relation to the local, or the transitional in relation to the national. It is, above all, the question of this sudden temporal commutation which blurs not only the inside and the outside, the boundaries of the political territory, but also the before and after of its duration, its history. **One can acknowledge the phenomena that Virilio and Baudrillard describe without necessarily accepting the overall conclusion that they have reached from their analyses.** Yes, **the blurring of distinctions between local and global, national and transnational, reality and virtuality, has altered the interaction between domination and resistance today**. **If 'real space' has become absorbed into the domains of speed and simulation**, as Virilio and Baudrillard claim, then **dynamics of dissent do not** primarily, or at least not only, **take place in their** **immediate spatial environment**. **Dissent operates as least as much in the virtuality of speed, the instantaneity of globalised communication**. **Consider**, among many other examples, **the** so-called **people power revolution** against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, the **dissident movement** led by Aung San Suu Kyi **in Burma,** or the massive **street protests that preceded the collapse of the Berlin Wall** in 1989. In each of these cases an act of popular dissent, successful or not, drew world-wide media attention and led to strong outside pressures being exerted upon the authority against which the protest was directed. **Dissent has become an important transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspect of late modern life.** It is a phenomenon that defies conventional spheres of inquiry and oozes, so to speak, into grey zones of theory and practice. **Dissident movements have come to transgress well-established boundaries between domestic and international politics** (for a more detailed engagement with these themes see Bleiker 2000). Look at a more specific example. In October 1999 countless street demonstrations took place in several counties: expressions of discontent with the events that followed the overwhelming East Timorese vote for independence from Indonesia. From New York to London, from Brisbane to Paris, from Wellington to Hongkong, a variety of public rallies, big or small, brief or sustained, expressed outrage over both the terror created by militia forces opposed to independence and the refusal of the Indonesian army to halt the ensuing killing and mass displacement of East Timorese. Many of these public protests were broadcasted on global television networks. The ensuing media-event contributed to the rapid emergence of a cross-territorial moral consensus that facilitated immediate action. In an unusually swift manner, **the UN Security Council agreed to dispatch immediately an intervention force, whose task consisted of protecting East Timorese people and securing a return to order. World wide protest actions against the Indonesian involvement in East Timor thus not only facilitated the speedy emergence of a near unanimous world-wide public and diplomatic agreement on the desirability of a military intervention, but also influenced the actions of Indonesia, whose permission essential to facilitate the employment of UN troops in East Timor.** Indeed, **debates in the Indonesian parliament underline the crucial importance that outsider presser played in bringing about a change in policy.** A public statement by the armed forces voting bloc, one of the most influential segments of the parliament, admitted that "as part of the international community we have to accept it [the transfer of power to the UN and the ensuing parliamentary decision to revoke the 1978 decree incorporating East Timor into Indonesia]." (Greenless 1999:1) **The phenomenon of speed has not annihilated dissent**. Quite to the contrary. Speed may well have erased space to the benefit of some kind of globalised instantaneity. Yet, **hyperreal images racing daily over our television screens nevertheless take part in a struggle over 'real time.**' **Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated they are, these images influence our perceptions of the world and thus also our responses to important issues of our time.** To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render Veal time' obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which political practices are constantly. Speed has increased the potential to interfere with the gradual transformation of societal values over 'real time. But where exactly is this potential for political action in a world of blurring boundaries, images and realities? One must acknowledge that with the advent of speed, the terrain of political struggle has changed fundamentally. Manifestations of dissent, such as street demonstrations or acts of civil disobedience, used to take place in a mostly local context They engaged the spatial dynamics that were operative in the interactive relationship between ruler and ruler. The contraction of space, however, has altered the very foundations of these socio-political dynamics. **Domination and resistance now interact in a much wider and more complex array of power relations. The boundaries of discursive struggles have widened** — **and so have**, consequently, **the possible terrains of dissent** **where** human **agency can be exerted**. Images of a protest march, for instance, may flicker over television screens world-wide only hours after people have taken to the street. As a result**, a local act of resistance can acquire almost immediately a much larger, cross-territorial dimension. It may generate a variety of outside** **pressures on the authorities** against which the protest was directed. **Any protest action that draws sufficient media attention thus has the potential to engender a political process that transcends its immediate spatial environment** **Political activism** **then no longer takes place** **solely in the streets** of Dilli and Belfast, **at the gates of factories** or around the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in front of Canberra's Old Parliament House. **Political activism**, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes, **has become intrinsically linked with the non-spatial logic of speed. Knowledge about this** **transformed logic of global politics can provide us with the potential for activist engagements and the resulting means to search for a more just world in the new millennium.**